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Deitzler et al.: Prosecutorial Discovery: An Overview

PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY: AN
OVERVIEW
HARRY G. DEITZLER*
SusAN KLimAs**

WALT AuvL***
I. INTRODUCTION
We have elected to employ an adversary system of crimi-

nal justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court
of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary
system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of
criminal justice would be defeated if judgment were to be
founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts.
The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence
in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within
the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice
is done, it is imperative to the function of the courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence
needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.'
This quote evidences a rapidly developing view that the ends
of justice are more apt to be achieved if both the prosecution and
the defense are required to "lay their cards on the table." As a
result, several states have enacted statutory schemes permitting
limited prosecutorial discovery. Even with these statutes, some
state courts have upheld prosecutorial discovery beyond that provided by statute. Similarly, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now contain provisions allowing the government access to
certain kinds of defense material.2 In West Virginia, the new
3
Rules of Criminal Procedure also provide for such discovery.
Despite the growing trend favoring prosecutorial discovery,
several issues have been raised which suggest that such discovery
* B.S. West Virginia University, 1973; J.D. West Virginia University, 1976;
Prosecuting Attorney, Wood County.
** Third-year law student, West Virginia University College of Law.
Third-year law student, West Virginia University College of Law.
' United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
2 See FED. R. CiuM. P. 16.
3 See W. VA. R. Cium. P. 12.1, 12.2, 16 (Proposed Final Draft).
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fs impermissible. Among these are whether prosecutorial discovery infringes upon the privilege against self-incrimination; the extent to which due process is implicated under discovery schemes;
whether the work product doctrine bars discovery; the extent to
which the attorney-client privilege precludes defense disclosures;
and, finally, whether trial courts have the power to enter discovery orders in the absence of express legislation.
It is the purpose of this article to analyze and discuss these
various issues for they have undoubtedly become of primary importance to West Virginia practitioners.
II. IssuEs
A.

The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

Prosecutorial discovery was, in the past, viewed as impermissible primarily because of the privilege against self-incrimination. 4 In fact, the earliest Supreme Court decision denying prosecutors the right to discovery was based solely on the Court's
belief that "[a]ny compulsory discovery by extorting the party's
oath, or compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles of a free government."'5 In light of this
broad definition ascribed to the scope of the privilege, very little
discovery existed in criminal cases until recently.
By 1968, however, pre-trial discovery in criminal cases had
drastically changed. Much of this change came about because of a
re-definition of the privilege against self-incrimination as it related to prosecutorial discovery.
As earlier defined, the privilege had encompassed both testimonial and real evidence e Starting with Schmerber v. Califor4 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. which provides in pertinent part: "No person

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...
This common law privilege is also embedded in the constitutions of every state
with the exception of Iowa and New Jersey. In Iowa, however, the privilege is
preserved by implication by the constitutional mandate against the deprivation of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. See State v. Height, 117 Iowa
650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902). Similarly, the privilege in New Jersey still exists as a
part of the common law. See State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619, 55 A. 743 (1903).
8 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886).
See id.
...
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nia,7 however, the Supreme Court retracted the broad boundaries
of the privilege. In Schmerber, the Court held that the scope of
the privilege was limited to only "communications" or "testimony" and that the "compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate
[the privilege]." s In Couch v. United States,9 the Court further
elaborated that the privilege against self-incrimination was an intimate and personal right which protected the private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought against state intrusion bent
upon extracting self-condemnation. 10 Because of its changed view
as to the scope of the privilege, the Court, in United States v.
Nobles,"" had little difficulty in concluding that a defendant may
be compelled to disclose
information regarding statements of
12
third-party witnesses.
The approach initially taken by the Supreme Court in limiting the scope of the privilege is interesting for the earliest state
case permitting extensive prosecutorial discovery avoided the selfincrimination issue rather than directly address it. In Jones v.
Superior Court,18 the California Supreme Court held that as long
as prosecutorial discovery was limited to items or witnesses that
would later be revealed at trial, the constitutional right was not
implicated. The court reasoned that since the defense would reveal these items at trial anyway, and thereby waive the privilege,
an earlier revelation exacted no penalty and, thus, was not a violation of the privilege. Instead, the earlier
revelation merely
14
helped the prosecution to be more effective.
Interesting enough, the United States Supreme Court also
5 when it
applied this same reasoning in Williams v. Florida"
stated:
Nothing in the fifth amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
8 Id. at 764.
' 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
10Id. at 327.
11 422 U.S. 225 (1975).

Is Id.
Is 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
14 Id. at 61, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
Is 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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State's case before announcing the nature of the defense, any
more than it entitles him to await the jury's verdict on the
State's case-in-chief before deciding whether or not to take the
stand himself."6
The dissenting opinion of Justice Peters in Jones rejected
the majority rationale later adopted by the United States Supreme Court. He argued that because of the prosecutor's heavy
burden of proof, the defendant should not open up any source of
potentially adverse information unless he felt that the state had
proved its case. Thus, the defendant could not adequately make
this judgment until after the prosecutor had presented evidence
in court. Even with extensive discovery, there was no way before
the trial that the defendant could know the strength of the evidence against him. 17 Nonetheless, this line of reasoning was
obviously rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
Williams.

16 Id. at 85. It should be noted, however, that subsequent to Jones but prior
to Williams, the California Supreme Court retreated somewhat from its broad
holding in Jones.In Prudhomme v. Super. Ct., 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 129 (1970), the court held:
[T]he principal element in determining whether a particular demand for
discovery should be allowed is not simply whether the information
sought pertains to an 'affirmative defense,' or whether defendant intends
to introduce or rely upon the evidence at trial, but whether disclosure
thereof conceivably might lighten the prosecution's burden of proving
the case in chief. Although the prosecution should not be completely
barred from pretrial discovery, defendant must be given the same right
as an ordinary witness to show that disclosure of particular information
could incriminate him.
Id. at 326, 466 P.2d at 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
This change in position was brought about by what the court viewed as certain significant developments in the law since Jones was decided in 1962. These
developments included an increasing emphasis placed by the United States Supreme Court upon the role played by the fifth amendment privilege in protecting
the rights of the accused; the promulgation by the Supreme Court in 1966 of Fed.
R. Crim. P. 16(c) which limited discovery to the reasonable disclosure of principal
evidence; and the questionable constitutionality of alibi statutes since the United
States Supreme Court had recently granted certiorari in Williams v. Florida which
had upheld Florida's alibi statute against a claim that it violated an accused's fifth
amendment rights. Id. at 323-25, 466 P.2d at 675-76, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32.
Obviously, the Supreme Court's ultimate decision in Williams has shown that
the concerns expressed by the California Supreme Court in Prudhomme were
mfounded. •
17 Jones v. Super. Ct., 58 Cal. 2d at 63, 372 P.2d at 923, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
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It should be emphasized, however, that this waiver theory
necessarily presupposes that only information which will be disclosed at trial would be discoverable. The rationale is clearly invalid for all other materials.
Another theory which avoids the self-incrimination issue is
that the defendant, by requesting discovery from the prosecution,
waives his privilege, and as a condition to receiving discovery,
must permit discovery by the government. This rationale is implicit in Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,18
in which prosecutorial discovery is conditioned on the defendant
first requesting discovery of documents, tangible objects, photographs, and reports.
The question, however, which arises under this theory is
whether defense discovery can be conditioned on a waiver of the
fifth amendment privilege.
It was partly for this reason that Justice Douglas opposed
sending the Rules of Criminal Procedure to Congress. While not
commenting on whether or not a fifth amendment violation is involved in prosecutorial discovery, he believed that if a violation is
involved, then to condition defense discovery on a waiver of the
privilege imposed a penalty on the exercise of the privilege.1 9
Justice Douglas' reasoning, however, was utilized by the district court in deciding United States v. Fratello.20 Relying upon
Malloy v. Hogan,21 the court reiterated that an option which exacts a penalty upon the exercise of the fifth amendment privilege
is impermissible. Further, the court defined penalty to mean the
imposition of any sanction which makes the assertion of the fifth
11 See FED. R. CraM. P. 16(b)(1)(A) which provides:
[I]f the defendant requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D)
of this rule, upon compliance with such request by the government, the
defendant on request of the government shall permit the government to

inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs,
tangible objects, or copies of portions thereof, which are within the pos-

session, custody, or control of the defendant and which the defendant
intends to introduce as evidence in chief at the trial.
1"See 39 F.R.D. 276 (1965) (statement in opposition to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure).

20 44 F.R.D. 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
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amendment costly.22

In response, the advocates of prosecutorial discovery argue
that defense discovery under Rule 16(c) is not a constitutional
right, but a statutory benefit. The burden placed on the defendant is attached to the exercise of the privilege of discovery, not
to the exercise of a constitutional right. Thus, there would be no
constitutional bar since the choice remains with the defendant to
bar discovery altogether. This rationale was accepted recently by
28
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
All of the above rationales, however, have in fact been avoiding the self-incrimination issue. None has actually dealt with
whether, waiver and avoidance theories aside, prosecutorial discovery actually infringes on the privilege.
In dealing with this issue, the privilege against self-incrimination should be balanced against the need for mutuality in criminal discovery. Formerly, precise pleadings informed the criminal
defendant of the case against him. As these requirements were
abandoned the need was felt for more information to be given the
defendant to balance his rights against the superior investigative
power of the state. Thus, the process of allowing defendants the
privilege of discovery was initiated. This swung the balance in
favor of the defendant, making surprise defenses common. Since
the government often had no advance warning or information
about this, the search for truth was frustrated. It was felt that the
criminal case should not be thought of as a poker game but as a
seaxch for truth.2 4 Therefore, any infringement upon the privilege
against self-incrimination is justified by this need to ascertain the
truth.2 5

This balancing of the self-incrimination privilege against
competing interests is well underway in other areas besides criminal discovery. In Harris v. New York,28 the United States Su"

United States v. Fratello, 44 F.R.D. at 447.
See United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1979).
'4 See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 82.
25 It should be noted, however, that most cases utilizing this justification have

failed to rely upon it solely. Instead, they have also relied upon the waiver and
avoidance theories. See Note, The Self-IncriminationPrivilege:Barrier to Criminal Discovery, 51 CAL. L. lav. 135 (1963).
26 401 U.S. 222 (1971). This decision concerned the admissibility of a defen-
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preme Court stated that the privilege against self-incrimination is
not absolute, but must sometimes give way to the competing judicial interests in the search for truth.
Furthermore, statutes which compel a witness to testify but
grant immunity or deny the use of his testimony against him,
have long been recognized as a permissible encroachment on the
fifth amendment.2 7 Similarly, statutes requiring an automobile
driver to stop and leave his name and address after an accident
have also been recognized as a justified encroachment on the privilege against self-incrimination" as well as those requiring the
keeping of records that may later be used in a criminal trial since
there is a sufficient relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the public concern."
Thus, in other areas, limitations on the self-incrimination
privilege have been accepted if the interest involved outweighs
the need for the privilege. Therefore, it can forcefully be asserted
that in the area of prosecutorial discovery the need to make the
criminal trial a search for truth justifies some encroachment on
the privilege. The major issue left unsettled, however, is the scope
of this permissible encroachment.
B.

Due Process

Another major question with respect to prosecutorial discovery is the extent to which due process bars such discovery. Two
Supreme Court decisions, however, have clearly held that due
process does not preclude the kind of prosecutorial discovery permitted, for example, by alibi statutes.
In Williams v. Florida,the Court upheld Florida's notice of
alibi statute against a due process attack. In justifying its holding,
the Court placed reliance on what it perceived as two important
interests. First, the state's interest in protecting itself against a
surprise alibi defense was viewed as legitimate, given the ease

dant's statement for impeachment purposes even though it had been obtained in
violation of Miranda guidelines.
King, Immunity for Witnesses: An Inventory of Caveats, 40 A.B.A.J. 377
(1969).
Byers v. Justice Ct., 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1969).
See Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1959); Berlain v. Bd. of
Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
28

"
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with which a defendant can fabricate one. Second, considerable
emphasis was placed upon the need to make the criminal trial a
search for truth. In this respect, the Court stated:
The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is
not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right
always to conceal their cards until played. We find ample room
in that system, at least as far as 'due process' is concerned, for
the instant Florida rule, which is designed to enhance the
search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain
facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence.3 0
Also of primary importance to the decision was the fact that the
alibi statute required the prosecution to undergo reciprocal
discovery.3 1
In fact, this importance placed upon reciprocity in criminal
discovery was underlined in the second major due process case of
Wardius v. Oregon.32 There, the state alibi statute in question required the defendant to give pretrial notice to the prosecution regarding his intention to introduce alibi evidence and the identity
of his alibi witnesses. However, the statute made no reciprocal
demands on the prosecution. This lack of reciprocity in the statute proved to be a fatal defect in the eyes of the Court. 33
The Court, however, went beyond the narrow confines of alibi
statutes in determining the requirements of due process in criminal discovery. It noted:
The growth of such discovery devices is a salutory development which by increasing the evidence available to both
parties, enhances the fairness of the adversary system ....
[N]othing in the Due Process Clause precludes states from experimenting with systems of broad discovery designed to
achieve the goals ....

Although the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded ... it does speak to the balance of forces between the
3
accused and his accuser. 8
o Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 82.
31
32

Id. at 81.

412 U.S. 470 (1973).
Id. at 472.
Id. at 474.
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Although Williams and Wardius related solely to alibi statutes, the language employed by the Court would also seem to delineate the scope of due process as it applies to broader
prosecutorial discovery. In fact, one state case has interpreted
Williams and Wardius as justifying a court's action in requiring a
defendant to disclose the general nature of his defense and a list
of general defense witnesses with accompanying statements.3 5
Like Wardius, the case also emphasized the importance that a
balance be struck between the discovery granted the defendant
3 6
and that granted the prosecution.

These cases, taken together, make it clear that due process
does not generally relate to the right to discovery, but merely to
the balance of discovery which must finally be achieved if discovery is permitted. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that
even state cases which have held that most prosecutorial discovery violates the privilege against self-incrimination concede that
37
due process does not preclude such discovery.
There is, however, one major exception to this general conclusion that due process does not relate to the right to discovery
but merely to the balance required if discovery is utilized. In
Brady v. Maryland,38 the United States Supreme Court held that
due process requires the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant.39 While this requirement pertains only to
defense discovery, it raises some question about the validity of
the waiver theory used to overcome the self-incrimination issue.
According to this theory, if a defendant requests discovery from
the prosecution, he is considered to have waived his right to claim
the privilege. If, however, the information which the defendant
requests is constitutionally required to be disclosed, the question
then becomes whether he can be said to have waived his fifth
amendment privilege by exercising another constitutional right.
In fact, an earlier federal court case suggested that if the prosecution has material which the defense considers so crucial to its case
State v. Nelson, 14 Wash. App. 658, 545 P.2d 36 (1975).
Id. at 665, 545 P.2d at 40.
See, e.g., Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974) wherein the court held
that most prosecutorial discovery violates the state privilege against self-incrimi38

nation but expressed doubts about whether due process barred such discovery.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
39 Id. at 87.
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that it would waive the privilege against self-incrimination, the
prosecution may be under a Brady obligation to disclose it anyway.40 This objection, however, appears to have been rejected by
the Supreme Court in Williams and Wardius.
In general, therefore, due process is not a bar to prosecutorial
discovery for it does not relate to the right to discovery but only
to the amount of reciprocity and fairness which is involved.
Clearly, most courts seem to regard with favor the enlarged scope
of discovery because it aids the search for truth. Thus, the only
question really impeding the widespread recognition of
prosecutorial discovery is. whether a defendant can be said to
have waived his fifth amendment rights by requesting discovery
from the prosecution, particularly when such a request pertains
to exculpatory evidence.
C.

Work Product

Another question raised by the advent of prosecutorial discovery is to what extent does the work product doctrine apply to
criminal discovery. Long recognized in civil cases, the general doctrine was originally recognized and defined by the Supreme Court
in Hickman v. Taylor.41 There, the Court held that there was a
qualified privilege from discovery of certain materials prepared by
an attorney in anticipation of litigation. 42 While Hickman dealt
with the doctrine in a civil context, the broad principles announced in that decision can easily be applied to criminal discovery as well.
Thus, the doctrine has been recognized in various state4 and
lower federal 44 criminal discovery cases and incorporated into the
See United States v. Fratello, 44 F.R.D. at 451.
329 U.S. 495 (1947).
42 Id. at 508. The Court recognized that a lawyer must work with a certain
degree of privacy in order to plan strategies, sift information and prepare legal
theories without undue interference. Thus, the doctrine would protect such materials as interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions and personal beliefs. See id. at 510-11.
41 See, e.g., State v. Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138, 449 P.2d 603 (1968) cert. denied,
396 U.S. 912 (1969); Peel v. State, 154 So. 2d 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); State
ex reL. Polley v. Super. Ct., 81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d 263 (1956).
4, See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973); In re
Jerkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
40

41
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." The Supreme Court has
also recognized the applicability of the doctrine. In United States
v. Nobles46 it considered the doctrine to be even more vital in
criminal cases because of the need for adequate safeguards to ensure the thorough preparation and presentation of each side of
the case. The Court went on to point out, however, that the privilege is not absolute and can be waived. Thus, the Court held that
the respondent had waived the privilege because an investigator
had testified and contrasted 4his
recollection of statements with
7
that of prosecution witnesses.
Despite the evident vitality of the work product doctrine, it
has rarely been claimed in criminal discovery cases, primarily because most discovery does not invoke work product. Hence, the
doctrine is not a significant impediment to broad prosecutorial
discovery.
D. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege has also traditionally been
viewed as a bar to prosecutorial discovery based upon the belief
that full and informed disclosure to an attorney is essential to the
fact finding process and that clients will only make these necessary disclosures
if they know that what they say will not be
48
revealed.

The privilege, however, applies only where necessary since it
has the effect of withholding relevant information.4'9 Thus, "[i]t
protects only those disclosures-necessary to obtain informed legal advice-which might not have been made absent the privi4"See

FED.

R. C0M. P. 16(b)(2) which provides:

[E]xcept as to scientific or medical reports, this subdivision does not

authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other
internal defense documents made by the defendant, or his attorneys or

agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the case, or of
statements made by the defendant, or by government or defense witnesses, or by prospective government or defense witnesses to the defendant, his agents or attorneys.
46422 U.S. 225 (1975).

47Id. at 238. The Court did emphasize, however, that to waive the privilege a
defendant must make testimonial use of the privileged material.
4" Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
49Id. at 403.
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lege." 50 Additionally, only communications which were intended
to be confidential are within the scope of the privilege. 51
The privilege extends not only to the attorney and client but
also to necessary intermediaries and agents through whom communications are made. Thus, reports made by a physician to
whom a defendant is sent by his attorney for examination (as distinguished from advice and treatment) are within the scope of the
privilege because such reports would be communications between
the defendant and his attorney through the physician.52
Like any other privilege, the attorney-client privilege may
also be waived. Furthermore, not only will express language constitute a waiver but also any conduct indicating an intent to
waive will suffice. Hence, the client waives the privilege as to all
cons3ultations relating to the same subject when the attorney or
his agent is called as a witness at trial.s
While the attorney-client privilege can preclude prosecutorial
discovery, it, like the work product doctrine, clearly plays an incidental role in such discovery.
E. Power of Trial Courts
The final question presented by the growing use of
prosecutorial discovery is the extent to which trial courts may
utilize their broad discretionary powers to authorize discovery
against a defendant in a criminal proceeding in the absence of
exp:ress legislation authorizing such discovery. This question is of
particular import in West Virginia since the supreme court of appeals has not been presented with the potential conflict between
prosecutorial discovery orders and a defendant's constitutionally
protected privilege against self-incrimination. However, precedent
in both state and federal jurisdictions, when combined with West
Virginia decisions permitting defense discovery, suggests the propriety of such discovery orders.

I$
/d.
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

§ 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
Jones v. Super. Ct., 58 Cal. 2d at 61, 372 P.2d at 921-22, 22 Cal. Rptr. at
881-32. However, if the physician were to be called at trial, the attorney-client
privilege would not apply.
13 8 WIGMORE, EV.DENCE § 2327 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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For example, Jones v. Superior Court," the first case permitting extensive prosecutorial discovery, was decided without the
benefit of legislation specifically authorizing the trial court to
grant discovery to either the defendant or the prosecution. Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court noted the extensive discovery rights granted by trial courts to defendants and proceeded to
allow prosecutorial discovery of evidence to be introduced by the
defendant in support of an affirmative defense.
Similarly, when presented with the same issue, the Washington Supreme Court stated: "[t]his state has long recognized the
inherent power of the trial court to grant discovery ....

This in-

herent power, based on trial administration, is not limited to that
which benefits the defendant. 8' 5 Ten years later, another Washington court held that a trial court had not abused its discretion
in excluding evidence when the defense failed to comply with a
discovery order. The court stated:
[W]e now consider whether that court abused its discretion by
finding defendants in contempt and ordering imprisonment
until answer. Trial judges have the inherent power to resort to
contempt procedures for enforcement of their orders ....

Having properly held defendants in contempt, the coercive
sanctions to be imposed lay within the sound discretion of the
trial court,' whose action will not be disturbed absent a clear
showing of an abuse of that discretion ....

The trial court's

orders finding the defendants in contempt and confining them
to jail until compliance were appropriate in the circumstances
and did not constitute an abuse of discretion ....
The Supreme Court of Indiana has likewise been forced to
decide a case concerning prosecutorial discovery without the benefit of an express legislative declaration. In State ex rel. Keller v.
Criminal Court,57 the trial court had granted both the prosecution and the defendant extensive discovery. In addition to being
required to appear in a lineup, put on clothing for identification
and perform other physical acts, the defendant was also required
to provide the prosecution with medical or scientific reports in his
possession and with notice of intent to raise any defense, together
Jones v. Super. Ct., 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
55 State v. Grove, 65 Wash. 2d 525, 527, 298 P.2d 170, 172 (1965).
State v. Nelson, 14 Wash. App. 658, 662-63, 545 P.2d 36, 40-41 (1975).
57 262 Ind. 420, 317 N.E.2d 433 (1974).
54
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with the names and addresses of witnesses he intended to call,
summaries of their statements, and their criminal records. The
defendant was also required to produce any document, photograph or tangible object he intended to introduce into evidence or
use for impeachment purposes. Disclosure by the state was likewise extensive. The prosecution was required to produce the
names, addresses, and statements of its prospective witnesses,
exculpatory material, grand jury minutes containing testimony of
prospective witnesses, reports of experts, papers or tangible objects to be introduced and records of prior convictions of state
witnesses.
In deciding the propriety of the trial court's action, the court
held that:
As a matter of state law ...

a trial court had the inherent

power to balance discovery privilege between the parties.
Thus, if any statute should deny of fail to provide for full discovery, within constitutional safeguards, the trial court may
balance the discovery procedure regardless of any omission or
prohibition in the statute.... [A] trial court may, sua sponte,
affirmatively order discovery. We have specifically so held:
'Discovery may be provided for by statute, court rule, or
granted by the inherent power of the trial court,' (citation
omitted). The object of a trial is the discovery of the truth. A
trial judge has the responsibility to direct the trial in a manner
which facilitates the ascertainment of the truth. The power to
order discovery is 'grounded in the inherent power of the trial
court to guide and control the proceedings' (citation
omitted).5 8
The court went on to point out that the discovery order issued by the trial court in the case may indeed have gone beyond
that which was traditionally granted in Indiana at that time, but
that "[t]o assert that a court's action is not traditional is not a
sound argument. . . . When a trial judge orders discovery, the
party so ordered must do more than point out that the order
9 is
unusual or innovative in order to prevail in prohibiting it."
Federal courts have also suggested that judges should not feel
restricted by express provisions allowing discovery. In this con:$ Id. at 421-22, 425, 317 N.E.2d at 434-35, 438.
9 Id. at 421-22, 317 N.E.2d at 434-35.
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nection a district court stated that a federal trial court:
[I]s not confined solely to the discovery techniques and parameters laid out in the Federal Criminal Rules. Prior to the first
promulgation of the Criminal Rules in 1946, Federal Criminal
Procedure in the District Courts grew out of the inherent
power of the Courts to develop their own procedure. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were not designed to and do
not entirely supplant this fundamental authority and residual
power of the Court. ... [t]he question as to when the Court
should permit this discovery is essentially one of policy, not of
power."
The situation, however, is somewhat different in West Virginia than in the above cited state jurisdictions. Statutorily, a defendant is entitled to discovery of his statements, reports of physical and mental examinations or scientific tests, and books,
papers, or tangible objects seized from or belonging to him.61
Thus, there is an express authorization for some discovery. In
1978, however, the supreme court of appeals followed the trend
established by federal courts by extending the right of defense
discovery beyond that provided in the statute to include production of any written statements made by prosecution witnesses
before cross-examination, together with an opportunity to examine these statements.2 Prior to that, the court had also recognized that the prosecution had a constitutional duty to disclose
any known exculpatory information to the defendant even in the
absence of a defense motion."
The court has apparently adopted the reasoning present in
those state cases justifying prosecutorial discovery orders on the
court's inherent power. In 1975 it noted that "[h]istorically, discovery in criminal cases has been largely within the discretion of
the trial judge....""
Thus, it appears that West Virginia is willing to follow the
trend toward broader discovery in criminal cases. In fact, the
court said as much when it stated: "[iun recent years this Court
United States v. Bender, 331 F. Supp. 1074, 1075-76 (C.D. Calif. 1971).
W. VA. CODE § 62-1A-1(3) (1977 Replacement Vol.).
' State v. Sette, 242 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1978).
"State v. Cowan, 156 W. Va. 827, 197 S.E.2d 641 (1973).
State v. Dudick, 213 S.E.2d 458, 463 (W. Va. 1975).
0
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has tended to look with increasing favor upon the liberal use of
discretion in criminal discovery ..
.""
".
Nonetheless, prosecutorial discovery has, up to the adoption of the new Rules of
Criminal Procedure, been limited. That is not to say, however,
that a trial court's discretion to allow broader prosecutorial discovery has been proscribed. In any event the West Virginia Rules
of Criminal Procedure will alleviate much of this uncertainty for
they contain provisions permitting prosecutorial discovery. This
fact indicates that such discovery is viewed favorably by the supreme court of appeals.
III.

CONCLUSION

With the adoption of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure in
West Virginia, prosecutorial discovery will become commonplace
in the future. This is only proper because our system of justice is
only served when a criminal trial is a search for truth and not a
contest of surprises. Yet, even with the new rules, some questions
will remain as to the extent of discovery permitted and the conditions under which it will be granted.

e5 Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss2/4

16

